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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes 
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and 
observance. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article XVIII) 
 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. (Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, U.S. Public Law No. 103-141, Section 3) 
 
Why is my liberty judged of another man’s conscience? (1 Corinthians, 10:29, King James Bible) 
 
 
1. Introduction & Literature Review 
     In 1964 a man named Daniel Seeger, accused of draft dodging, found his case taken to the 
United States Supreme Court.  He had sought conscientious-objector status for years and met 
with multiple refusals due to his lack of belief in a Supreme Being. Seeger understood that 
conscientious objection required a religious origin to be legally recognized and asserted his claim 
to be legitimately religious in these words: 
     Personally, I do not believe that life derives any meaning from cosmic design but I do believe that a   
     person can give his life meaning by doing something worthwhile with it, i.e., by relating his existence  
     in a constructive and compassionate way to the problems of his social environment. In this sense  
     pacifism, among other things, is for me a transcendent concern and it is in this respect that I consider  
     myself religious. 
The court expanded its definition of “religion” to no longer require faith in God, in order to 
accommodate the pacifism of Seeger, an atheistic Quaker. This decision highlights the subject of 
legal exemptions, normative concerns about what beliefs if any should warrant such discharge 
from the law, and hence holds far-reaching implications for relativistic or universally 
prescriptive approaches to justice.  Contemplation of these issues compels one to analysis not 
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only of the normative questions orbiting this subject but also of current patterns and possible 
explanations of legal exemptions as they presently stand throughout the Western World. 
  
     The tension between uniform legal application and legal accommodation-of-difference has 
become a frequent focus of contemporary political philosophy. Legal exemptions for medical or 
other similar circumstantial causes meet with little controversy, but when the only factor 
separating a citizen who must obey a law from one who need not obey lies in differing beliefs the 
topic demands attention. Moral, political and legal theorists question whether such exemptions 
are warranted and, if so, by which beliefs. Exemptions based in belief, when granted, come in 
two kinds, one inclusive of the other but more expansive: religious exemptions and philosophical 
exemptions. The former exempts individuals whose objection to the relevant law stems from a 
belief that can be categorized as religious (complicated by the difficulty inherent in undertaking 
such a categorization). The latter exempts on the basis of moral convictions that may or may not 
be religious in nature. The literature on this issue ranges from genealogies of the legal definitions 
of “religious” and discussions doubting the demonstrability of sincere belief, to normative 
debates on the authority of the individual in relation to the state. These contributions are mainly 
theoretical in nature. Although a few comparative studies have analyzed particular exemptions 
(i.e., animal slaughter regulation exemptions) across states from a religious rights standpoint, no 
empirical work has yet considered exemptions across multiple fields to examine overall 
differences in the distribution of exemptions or to discern variance in the availability of religious 
and philosophical exemptions across states. I will tread exactly this uncharted territory of 
examining differences in the empirical reality of exemptions across the U.S., Western Europe 
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and several other liberal democracies and thence seek to explain the variance, situating the 
findings in the historical progression of politico-philosophic thought.  
 
Religion, Morality and Law 
     Two interrelated normative problems present themselves in relation to ethical legal 
exemptions: the justifiability of ethical exemptions of any kind and the justifiability of 
nonreligious exemptions. (Philosophical exemptions by definition encompass religious 
exemptions, negating the need to question the justice of nonreligious exemptions in isolation). I 
will now provide a sketch of these dilemmas and their origin. On one side stands exemption-
skepticism, the view that the law should apply to all, blind to divergence in religious belief or 
nonreligious ethical orientation (Strnadová, 213). Opposing this are the advocates of pluralism 
and accommodation-of-difference. They come in two varieties: the proponents of religious 
freedom who uphold the imperatives of faith over any mortal law on the one side and the 
champions of self-determination whether its drive be spiritual or secular on the other. The 
wrestling of these three outlooks predates the problem of legal exemptions. As one writer notes, 
“The major agencies of social control are morals, religion and law. In the beginning of law these 
are not differentiated” (Pound, 18).  
 
     At the dawn of civilization religious institutions bore the burden of keeping social order, and 
the earliest governments, from what is known, were almost invariably allied to or fused with 
religious authority. In the fifth century B.C., Sumerian city-states first crystallized around vast 
polyfunctional temples and were ruled by governor-priests (Maisels 344). In this system the chief 
executive was the eminent power of the Sumerian pantheon, Enlil, and all government 
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functionaries were referred to as his servants (Maisels, 345). Ancient Egypt remains famed for its 
Imperial cult of god-kings. Each Greek polis worshiped a patron deity, and embraced religion as 
a political force, the will of the deity inseparable from the good of the polis it protected. Ergo, for 
citizens in such systems as those in Sumer, Egypt and Greece, obedience to the law and religious 
piety were one.  Courts and temples were merely separate structures wherein one enacted 
different aspects of the regnant Authority’s will, equal in status: “If anyone steal the property of 
a temple or of the court, he shall be put to death” (The Code of Hammurabi, Article VI). When 
religious and governmental authority first began to distinguish themselves, law slithered into 
religion’s directing role, commanding with the force of the state where the incentives of divine 
punishment and favor had once reigned. According to one scholar, “State and religion have 
historically had an uneasy relationship, at times being close allies, at others harsh adversaries” 
(Cosgel, 401). Even today law, religion and morality remain intertwined and sometimes 
interchangeable. The issue of ethical exemptions they now surround contrasts in its youth, a 
current incarnation of a primordial struggle. There are no belief-based exemptions in the Code of 
Hammurabi; such exceptions mark complicated modern systems capable of granting that not all 
of their laws may be consistent with the dictates of individual conscience (Cohen, 269). Systems, 
in other words, that dare to acknowledge tension between morality and religion and law.  
 
An Exemption’s Evolution 
     A return to the tale of Mr. Seeger and the circumstances surrounding his case will illustrate 
the above-described tension. In the beginning there was the question of whether conscientious 
exemption should be allowed at all. From the state’s perspective, a citizen who disagrees with 
any of its laws is in error, just as from the citizen’s point of view it is the state that errs (Kemp, 
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314). To excuse an error out of consideration for its earnestness, then, out of its agents’ own 
sense of conscience and awareness of the state’s moral duties to its citizens even when they go 
astray, provided the case is not too extreme, may prompt the enactment of statutory exemptions. 
For a more detailed psychoanalysis of the reasoning process culminating in the awarding of 
exemptions see Kemp, 314-320.  A 1917 U.S. conscientious objection statute exempted only 
members of “any well-recognized religious sect or organization… whose existing creed or 
principles forbid its members to participate in war” (Smith, 86). Here law bowed to 
institutionalized religion. By 1940 this statute was broadened to make the requirement of 
organized religious affiliation less explicit, exempting anyone who “by reason of religious 
training or belief is conscientiously opposed to war.” This bestowed the individual with the 
authority to self-determine religious beliefs regardless of the presence or lack thereof of 
institutions with comparable beliefs and without the need for membership in any such existing 
institution. Unfortunately for Seeger, this statute would be struck down before his case. 
 
     In 1943 a nonreligious pacifist was granted exemption through this act, stirring discomfort 
and a clarification of its requirements. It was decided that “philosophy and morals and social 
policy without the concept of a deity cannot be said to be religion” but “merely personal moral 
codes” and that only “an individual’s belief in relation to a Supreme Being” would merit 
exemption (Macgill1357-9). “The Supreme Being clause limited the exemption to objections 
stemming from externally compelled beliefs, to the exclusion of ones internally derived” 
(Macgill, 1360). Self-determination of legally respected conscience was for a time rescinded. Yet 
concessions to religion soon gave way to recognition of nonreligious conscience. In 1968, the 
Supreme Court heard Seeger’s case. The criteria elevating one to the status of a conscientious 
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objector were broadened to include the nonreligious provided each held “a sincere and 
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by God 
in those admittedly qualifying for the exemption” emphasizing that no difference was to be 
drawn between “externally and internally derived beliefs” (Mcgill 1364, 68). While religion still 
in some ways legally outweighs secular conscience in the United States, as in the Constitution 
where proposed amendments to protect “freedom of conscience” in addition to religion have 
failed, by 1970 government was “to treat religious and secular conscience equally” when 
granting military exemptions (Greene, 963; Columbia Law Review, 1431).  
 
Rising Secularization 
     Two conflicting narratives describe current trends in religiosity, both of which add to the 
relevance of this paper in that they wield undeniable political and legal implications in the arena 
of exemptions. First, there is the narrative of spreading secularization. As one analysis concludes, 
“Experts argue that, proportionally, there are more atheists in the world than ever before” 
(Zuckerman via Rosenblum, 398). According to this narrative, ever-advancing and publicly 
accessible science provides the certainty once only religion afforded, gradually colonizing the 
territory of public confidence where religion hitherto reigned unquestioned  The unaffiliated, an 
identifier inclusive of atheists, agnostics and those simply lacking any interest in religion, now 
hold the position of being the largest religious designation in the population of the state of 
Colorado, where one in four people self-identifies as such (Pew Forum on Religion and Public 
Life, 2007). It is the second largest religious (or rather nonreligious) label in California, Oregon, 
Washington, Nevada, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and forms over 
twenty percent of the population of Arizona and New Mexico (Ibid). As one study finds, “The U. 
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S. population continues to show signs of becoming less religious, with one out of every five 
Americans failing to indicate a religious identity in 2008” (Kosmin & Keysar 2008). Even those 
who are religious are adapting more secular practices and worldviews, particularly the educated. 
This possesses manifest political significance: 
     In the United States, the education levels of various denominations are inversely correlated with their  
     church attendance: Episcopalians are both the most highly educated and attend church the least  
     amongst Christian denominations, while Baptists are the least educated and attend church the most  
     regularly… Because education correlates with public influence, those denominations whose adherents  
     have public influence are more likely to have adherents who spend less time in church and believe  
     fewer traditional teachings (McCusker 398). 
A differing although perhaps not mutually exclusive narrative describes a resurgence of religion, 
occurring as a reaction to secularization. Both trends arguably foreshadow more conflict between 
religious (or irreligious) beliefs and the law.  
 
Religious Resurgence 
     Whereas the classical secularization thesis maintains the decline of religion’s significance in 
modern society and politics, many hold a different view of religious and societal evolution, one 
variation whereof is titled religious economies theory, which proposes that religion has actually 
become more influential and dynamic over time” (Featherstone, 78). Despite the popularity of 
secularization theory in the social sciences, evidence to the contrary abounds. To counter the 
common theoretic explanation that modernization and the spread of scientific mindedness lead to 
the inevitable societal dissolution or lessening of religion, one need only look at the United 
States, where church attendance rates are today considerably higher than in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries: “paradoxically the most modernized nation in the world has become, and 
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remains, one of the most religious societies on the planet” (Featherstone, 80). Competition in a 
vibrant global religious economy has been suggested as an alternative to Samuel Huntington’s 
famous “clash of civilizations” theory of 1993 (Finke, 45). Although religious economies theory 
often focuses primarily on religious influence in the sphere of international politics, its exalting 
of religion to the status of a central force motivating political decisions clearly involves 
additional consequences for domestic political outcomes and the crafting of laws. Whether 
religiosity is currently declining, rising, or doing both in different ways, its evolving role in 
society obviates the importance of scrutinizing religious and nonreligious legal exemptions to the 
study of law and political science. 
 
Relativism and Universalism 
     Returning to the tension between those advocating accommodation-of-difference and their 
opponents calling for a single, universally applicable law, this paper will attempt to clarify their 
respective philosophic foundations. Moral relativism drives accommodation-of-difference; 
universalism provides a common justification of exemption-skepticism. When Friedrich 
Nietzsche notoriously proclaimed “Gott ist tot” (God is dead) late in the nineteenth century, he 
referred to the demise not only of religion, but of all unquestionable Truth of an allegedly 
objective or universally applicable nature, instead asserting that all is dependent upon 
perspective. One of the most powerful and enduring concepts of postmodernism, an element of 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism has percolated throughout Western culture, evolving into the cultural 
relativism, political correctness and pluralistic approach now so common in liberal democracies. 
Nietzsche himself would have mocked this now dominant form of relativism, for in his 
worldview, while all truths were subjective they were certainly not equally noble.  The idea of a 
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multiplicity of truth allows for equal though conflicting moral norms, neither of which can 
objectively be lauded as better than the other: as one writer words, “different people have 
different cultures, and what we sense as outrageous or as morally commendable may not be so in 
their eyes, in their terms or by their values” which must be respected as equally compelling 
(Browning, 20).  This absence of externally-derived and thus universally valid standards of 
morality prompts political scientists to ask questions such as: 
     If there are no external reasons, if all we have are reasons and arguments internal to the moral    
     psychologies of agents, are we theoretically obliged to concede a relativism about values,  
     such that secular liberal values have only a relative truth on their side? (Bilgrami, 175-6). 
Such questioning leads, by the logic of relativism, not only to multicultural tolerance but to laws 
that allow for numerous religious and philosophical legal exemptions so that citizens might 
pursue individual moral truths that differ from the morality espoused by the law. Challenging 
and likely predating relativism is the Enlightenment faith in self-evident Truth binding all men 
equally, which results in identical application of the law to all citizens. The clash between these 
two theories of legal justice can then be said to be rooted in a philosophical battle between 
universal and relativistic notions of truth and morality. Belief-based exemptions ineludibly imply 
some degree of moral relativism; the policy of one-law-for-all finds its grounding in moral 
universalism or objectivism.    
 
Religious Constraints on Relativism 
     Another way to approach these theoretical underpinnings (which have been established as 
trust in the state’s universally applicable moral system on the one hand, and on the other as a 
relativistic acceptance of the view that different moralities are of equal worth) is from their 
associations with various religions. This will elucidate why some support religious exemptions 
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but not exemptions for nonreligious philosophical beliefs. The relativistic moral attitude is of 
course not uniquely the product of postmodern philosophy, but also extracts validation from 
older Protestant thought, for the elimination of religious hierarchy and subsequent equalization 
of each individual’s link to his deity can be seen as necessitating equal authority for differing 
views, even when these views conflict with those made into law by the majority (Howard, 107). 
While this worldview maintains the existence of a single truth, it is relativistic in that it 
emphasizes the difficulty of determining which men have access to this truth and thus which 
opinions are to be believed. To emphasize how far into the past moral relativism’s roots extend, 
it would here be beneficial to reiterate one of the quotes located at the beginning of this paper 
which expresses an uncharacteristically relativistic note in a Book otherwise mainly concerned 
with espousing a universal religion:  Why is my liberty judged of another man’s conscience? (1 
Corinthians, 10:29, King James Bible). The Protestant form of moral equalization entails limits 
on itself: differing viewpoints can only merit equal consideration insofar as they originate in an 
individual’s connection with God and remain recognizable as interpretations of religious 
morality. A belief outlying this standard would not receive exemptive legal acknowledgment 
until the language of laws pertaining to ethical exemptions underwent secularization, as 
happened in the abovementioned case of Mr. Seeger.  
 
Individual Authority and the Future of Law 
     While religious legal exemptions remain far more widespread than their nonreligious 
equivalents (as the data in the quantitative crux of this thesis will demonstrate), gradually 
swelling secularization of ethical exemptions prompts the question: if all viewpoints merit equal 
consideration, how does the authority of a given individual conscience or will stand in relation to 
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the authority of law as the democratic expression of collective conscience? One view is that 
“individuals offer their obedience to the state as a moral choice and, by their consent, grant moral 
force to choices collectively made” (Unknown, Harvard Law Review, 1703). Yet if an 
individual’s morality lies too far outside the range of accepted, legally-enforced morality, this 
gives rise to cases for which no one could sanely propose legal accommodation. No reasonable 
society would grant a legal exemption to a murderer who says that by his personal moral code 
murder is permissible and asks that his belief be legally accommodated. The volitional necessity 
of any given deeply-held belief does not provide sufficient grounds for legal accommodation 
(Koppelman, 216). When religion remained a necessary component of legally recognized 
exemption-worthy belief, as in the 1917 version of U.S. conscientious objection law, the 
criterion for determining which beliefs deserved accommodation was clear: membership in a 
respected religious institution espousing similar beliefs. However the trend of secularization is 
slowly spreading the idea that governments should not favor religious values over nonreligious 
values in the construction and implementation of ethical legal policy (Mahoney, 305). The legal 
distinction or lack thereof between religious and non-religious philosophical exemptions holds 
implications for the justification of belief-based exemptions of any kind. Without a clear-cut 
criterion like membership in a particular church, there exists no intuitive boundary as to which 
beliefs merit exemptions beyond extreme cases like the abovementioned murderer (whose belief 
lies too far outside the moral norm for consideration) and the pacifist (whose belief is readily 
comprehensible even to those who disagree with it, as it is merely a radical expansion of the 
norm against unprovoked violence common to all homo sapiens with functional social instincts). 
Many beliefs are not so unthinkable as the murderer’s, yet not so understandable as the pacifist’s, 
falling instead at some indeterminate point between the two. How then can legal theorists 
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determine the boundary between folly unworthy of accommodation and intelligent, sincere 
individualism deserving of exemptive recognition? If secularization continues, answering this 
question may delineate the very limits of the law’s authority and ultimately define the future of 
the relationship of government to the individual. While such an undertaking lies beyond the 
scope of this project, a quantitative and comparative analysis of laws on the issue as they 
currently stand in several liberal democracies may offer a denser foundation from which to 
expand scholarship in this area. Whether modern Western democracies offer many or few belief-
based exemptions, whether their recipients need be religious or may receive exemption for 
convictions of a nonreligious nature, and the factors which predict decisions on these vital 
matters, shall herein be investigated to this exigent purpose.  
 
2. Analysis of Western Democracies 
 
Hypotheses and Set-Up 
     Looking at the extent to which ethical legal exemptions are available in several countries in 
Western Europe, as well as Australia, Canada, and the U.S., will clarify how each has handled 
the quandaries discussed above and allow inquiry into what factors have influenced each 
country’s relative alliance within the debates of one-law-for-all versus respect-for-differences, 
and the validity of only religious versus both religious and nonreligious philosophical claims. 
Some examples of common exemptions include exemptions from mandatory military service, 
from taxes (in the case of organizations), from dress codes for official photographs on national 
identification cards or licenses, from required vaccinations, and from following an established 
method of killing animals (in the case of ritual slaughter).  
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• Hypothesis 1: Lower levels of general and/or political religiosity cause greater equality 
between religious and nonreligious exemptions. 
• Hypothesis 2: Greater levels of general and/or political religiosity cause fewer exemptions of 
any kind. 
• Hypothesis 3: Lower levels of religious tolerance cause fewer exemptions of any kind.  
• Hypothesis 4: States with majority Protestant populations will give more exemptions relative 
to majority Catholic states. 
The proposition behind the first hypothesis is that a less religious or more secular population will 
be less likely to draw distinctions between religious and nonreligious philosophical declarations, 
and this will ultimately result in laws that treat the two similarly. The basis for hypotheses 2 and 
3 is the idea that greater religiosity leads to laws less sympathetic to religious minorities and the 
nonreligious. (Religious exemptions tend to exist for religious minorities because presumably a 
state’s laws will have no conflict with the majority religion) (McCusker 395). However, it must 
be noted that causation may flow in the opposite direction as well: it has been suggested that 
greater legal institutionalization of a state’s dominant culture leads to lessening tolerance towards 
minorities (Weldon, 331). Party policy (which eventually influences law) is affected not only by 
religiosity but by specific religious composition (Janda 349). Therefore this study will look for 
variance between predominantly Catholic and Protestant areas, with the expectation that, after 
controlling for level of religiosity, states with majority Protestant populations will allow more 
exemptions than majority Catholic ones, due to the tradition of pluralism brought about by the 
equalization of individuals enacted by the Protestant reformation (Howard 91).  
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     The dependent variable will be measured by an index that examines each state’s relative 
frequency of religious exemptions and of variance in exemptions applicable to religious versus 
nonreligious philosophical claims. This study will concern itself with the following states: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S. To produce the index, several 
common exemptions will be examined, with each state listed in each case as allowing no 
exemptions, religious exemptions or both religious and nonreligious philosophical exemptions 
(often called “conscientious exemptions” when no distinction is made). Significant variance in the 
overall frequency of exemptions’ availability will then be subject to explanatory analysis. While 
no momentous variance in the equality of religious and nonreligious exemptions rests in the 
following datasets, the across-the-board predominance of religious exemptions will receive 
analytical attention. 
 
     The following factors will be taken into account as independent variables: tolerance towards 
different faiths and irreligion (self-reported), subjective religiosity (self-reported), behavioral 
religiosity (church attendance), political religiosity (presence of prominent parties with ties to a 
religion, official endorsement of a state religion, etc.), majority religion type (Catholic or Protestant), 
politicalness (self-reported), legal system type (common law or civil law system) and two 
philosophical public opinion measures (self-reported position on the relative importance of freedom 
versus equality and the importance of one’s say in government). Data to calculate the first four, the 
sixth and last two of these factors will be obtained from the World Values Survey.  
 
The Data 
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Below is a chart of the data I have collected followed by an explanation for each area of 
exemption. After these explanations an index of relative exemption levels will be presented. 
 Military Tax Medical Dress  
 
Slaughter Methods 
 Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. 
U.S. 2 2 1 1 0.36 0.94 0 1 1 1 
AUSTRAL. 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
CANADA 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
AUSTRIA 1 1 0 1 NM NM 0 1 0 1 
BELGIUM 0 1 1 1 NM NM 0 0 0 0 
DENMARK 1 1 0 1 NM NM 0 1 0 1 
FINLAND 2 2 1 1 NM NM 1 1 0 1 
FRANCE 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
GERMANY 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 
ITALY 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
NETHERL. 0 1 0 1 NM NM 0 0 0 1 
NORWAY 2 2 1 1 NM NM 0 0 0 0 
SPAIN 1 1 0 1 NM NM 0 0 0 1 
SWEDEN 0 1 0 1 NM NM 0 1 0 0 
SWITZ. 2 2 0 1 NM NM 0 1 0 0 
U.K. 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
 
Explanation of Military Exemption Scores 
     There exist two types of military exemptions: exemption from conscription claimed before 
deployment (Type 1) and exemption based on an ethical objection that arises after enrollment 
(Type 2). Type 2, when offered, exempts regardless of whether enrollment was voluntary or 
conscripted. In countries that have suspended or do not currently practice conscription, many still 
have the right to Type 1 exemptions legally enshrined in the case of renewed conscription.  
 Conscription Type 1 legally 
enshrined or available 
Type 2 available 
U.S. No (since 1973) Yes Yes 
AUSTRALIA No (since 1972) Yes No 
CANADA No (since 1945) Yes Yes 
AUSTRIA Yes Yes No 
BELGIUM No (since 1992) Yes No 
DENMARK Yes Yes No 
FINLAND Yes Yes Yes 
FRANCE No (since 2001) No No 
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GERMANY No (since 2011) Yes Yes 
ITALY No (since 2000) Yes No 
NETHERLANDS No (since 1992) Yes No 
NORWAY Yes Yes Yes 
SPAIN No (since 2001) Yes No 
SWEDEN No (since 2010) Yes No 
SWITZERLAND Yes Yes Yes 
U.K. No (last conscript 
discharged in 1963) 
Yes Yes 
[All data from War Resisters’ International web database: http://www.wri-
irg.org/programmes/world_survey] 
 
With the exception of France, all countries have Type 1 exemptions available or legally 
enshrined so as to become available should conscription recur. (While no longer legally ensured, 
it should be noted that France did award exemptions in the past, although fewer than other states). 
Because most of these countries have all had compulsory service recently and the four 
exceptions, the U.S., Australia, Canada and the U.K., have both Type 1 and Type 2 exemptions, 
current conscription is not taken into account in the calculation of exemption score. Had there 
been a country that suspended conscription more than two decades ago that did not offer Type 1 
exemptions, this would have problematized the data by raising the possibility that secular 
objections simply never arose at the time when conscription last took effect. In such a scenario, 
scoring without taking this into account would have been the equivalent of penalizing a country 
for having no rainforest protection laws when it contained no rainforests. As it is, the score 
scheme goes as follows:  
No Exemptions Type 1 Type 1 & 2 
0 points 1 point 2 points 
 
 
Explanation of Tax Exemption Scores 
     Here the score is calculated by inquiring into whether religious organizations (churches) 
receive tax exemptions and tax-deductible donations and whether the largest (or one of the 
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largest in the case of countries with several prominent organizations) equivalent secularist 
associations receives similar exemptions. The tax exempt statuses of the following secularist 
societies were investigated: 
U.S. American Atheists (http://www.atheists.org/) 
AUSTRALIA Atheist Foundation of Australia (http://www.atheistfoundation.org.au/) 
CANADA Humanist Association of Canada (http://humanistcanada.ca/) 
AUSTRIA Allianz für Humanismus und Atheismus (http://atheisten.at/) 
BELGIUM Centre d’Action Laïque (http://www.laicite.be/) 
DENMARK Dansk Ateistisk Selskab (http://www.ateist.dk/) 
FINLAND Suomen Ateistiyhdistys (http://www.dlc.fi/~etkirja/Ateistit.htm) 
FRANCE L’Association Athéisme (http://atheisme.internation.free.fr/) 
GERMANY Bund der Konfessionslosen und Atheisten (http://www.ibka.org/) 
ITALY Unione degli Atei e degli Agnostici Razionalisti (http://www.uaar.it/) 
NETHERL. De Vrije Gedachte (http://www.devrijegedachte.nl/) 
NORWAY Human-Etisk Forbund (http://www.human.no) 
SPAIN Unión de Ateos y Librepensadores de España (http://ateos.org/) 
SWEDEN Humanisterna (http://www.humanisterna.se/) 
SWITZ. Freidenker-Vereinigung der Schweiz (http://www.frei-denken.ch) 
U.K. British Humanist Association (http://www.humanism.org.uk) 
 
 
Explanation of Medical Exemption Scores 
     Although there exist many kinds of ethical exemptions in the medical realm, for the purposes 
of simplifying the data to be gathered, this study has limited itself to investigation of exemptions 
for compulsory vaccinations. Several countries in this study do not legally compel vaccination, 
and in these cases NM, standing for Not Mandatory, stands in the column where the score would 
have appeared. Because this study counts overall instances of exemption, the fact that not all 
states qualify to receive a score in this area is not a problem. The states under study in which 
inoculation is not mandatory under the law and where unvaccinated children meet with little 
disadvantage in entering school (although it should be noted that rates remain high despite this) 
are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland (World 
Health Organization 4, 8; MacIntyre 440; Allier 1; Martin 268). In Canada vaccination is not 
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mandatory in all provinces, but those requiring it offer exemptions. In the United States eighteen 
states allow for nonreligious philosophical exemptions in the area of required vaccinations, while 
all but three states give religious exemptions. This has been reflected in the U.S. score by, rather 
than assigning a 0 or 1, using the percentage of exempting states as the final score. In all other 
cases a 1 denotes the availability of exemption and a 0 the lack thereof. 
 
Explanation of Dress Exemption Scores 
     All national identification cards and licenses require photographs wherein the face of the card 
holder is unobscured and recognizable. For this reason head-coverings are often banned in such 
photographs. Several states have made exemptions for religious headgear, such as yarmulkes, 
wigs, and, provided it is folded so as not to obscure the face, the head-scarves worn by many 
female adherents of Islam. Finland is the only state in this study which does not specify that such 
coverings have to be religious in nature. So long as they do not conceal the face and are 
habitually worn, presumably nonreligious accessories would be accepted. While this exemption 
may seem, prima facie, to lack the magnitude of the other exemption categories mentioned thus 
far, it involves the same principle of a belief-based legal exception. This summer in Austria a 
man named Niko Alm, in protest of the religious bias of the headgear exemption in his country, 
successfully fought a three year battle to be allowed to wear a spaghetti strainer on his head in 
his driver’s license photograph as a “pastafarian,” a follower of a parody religion known as the 
Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (BBC, 1). Even an ostensibly inconsequential law can 
carry symbolic significance.  When exemptions are allowed to the headgear rule a 1 is assigned, 
otherwise a 0. (Although Alm was eventually accommodated in the granting of a license 
featuring his nonreligious head-covering, he only received this right through a facetious religious 
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claim. The law on the books remains exclusive of nonreligious headgear, and thus Austria is not 
listed as offering a philosophical exemption). 
 
Explanation of Animal Slaughter Method Exemption Scores 
     All the states under consideration have humane slaughter laws whereby farm animals must be 
injected with a substance that prevents their feeling pain before they are killed. This is 
incompatible with the traditional methods of ritual animal slaughter used to produce halal and 
kosher meat by Muslims and Jews, respectively. Thus some states offer exemptions in regards to 
injection requirements for the purposes of halal and kosher meat creation. Of the states in this 
study only the U.S. and Italy allow for relaxation of injection laws for reasons that are not 
explicitly religious. In Italy traditional, non-anaesthetized animal killing is allowed if performed 
in the executioner’s yard on an animal to be consumed by his or her family. In the U.S. 
traditional killing is allowed if it is part of the slaughterer’s cultural tradition (this exemption 
appears to have been created with Native Americans in mind), regardless of whether that 
tradition is religious. While these exemptions could be argued to not qualify as purely belief-
based in nature, the specific requirements (a certain manner of killing in the case of Italy and a 
specific cultural heritage in the U.S.) can be seen as merely indicating the sincerity of a required 
belief, as in cases where membership in a religious institution is required as proof of a religious 
claim’s authenticity. Tribal membership in the U.S. as an indicator of the presence of a sincere 
belief compelling one to utilize traditional slaughter techniques bears particular resemblance to 
cases wherein church or mosque or synagogue, et cetera, membership is considered evidence of 
genuine belief.  The restrictions dictated by Italian law also seem to act as indicators that the 
exemption recipient is acting out of a belief in tradition in that they weed out those with 
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evidently falsified beliefs. It accomplishes this by specifying a manner of killing that is 
traditional in all aspects and thus prevents cases of a commercial meat producer taking advantage 
of the exemption policy merely to save money by forgoing the requisite injections. Where an 
exemption is allowed a 1 is allocated and in other cases a 0.  
 
Index of Relative Exemption Levels in Western Europe and the U.S. 
     Based on the scores in the data listed above each state receives three scores in the index: a 
score for the overall availability of exemptions, a score for the availability of philosophical 
exemptions and a score showing the difference in availability between religious and 
philosophical exemptions (number of philosophical exemptions subtracted from the number of 
religious exemptions). This yields the following: 
 









Difference in Availability 




U.S. 10.3 5.94 4.36 1.58 
AUSTRALIA 7 5 2 3 
CANADA 9 5 4 1 
AUSTRIA 4 4 1 3 
BELGIUM 3 2 1 1 
DENMARK 5 4 1 3 
FINLAND 9 5 4 1 
FRANCE 3 2 1 1 
GERMANY 7 4 3 1 
ITALY 6  3 3 0 
NETHERL. 3 3 0 3 
NORWAY 6 3 3 0 
SPAIN 4 3 1 2 
SWEDEN 3 3  0 3 
SWITZ. 6 4 2 2 
U.K. 10 6 4 2 
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Initial Observations 
     The most striking difference prima facie is that between the large number of exemptions 
available in the U.S., U.K., Canada, Finland, and to a lesser extent, Australia and Germany, 
relative to the small number available in France, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands. Another 
surprise is the great variability amongst Nordic countries where one might expect a pattern. 
Finland places amongst the most frequently exemption-granting states and Sweden amongst the 
least while Norway gives a number of exemptions situating its policies in the center between 
these two extremes. Less surprising is the difference between the U.S., with its devotion to 
religious freedom, and France, as its policy of laïcité exists to protect the state from religion 
rather than religion from the state (Gedicks, 476). Canada’s, Australia’s, and the U.K.’s 
similarity to the U.S. is also strikingly intuitive, for their respective legal systems and cultures 
share the same historical roots. Religious exemptions are more numerous than philosophical 
exemptions overall. Interestingly, states that give more religious exemptions also give 
significantly more philosophical exemptions (Pearson Correlation = .712). This suggests that an 
attitude in favor of accommodating differences, while initially limited to religion, easily spreads 
to accommodate extra-religious differences as well. This is more in line with the philosophical 
justification of postmodern relativism cited in the introduction than with the Protestant-rooted 
form of relativism posited, and seems to support the classical secularization thesis. 
 































U.S. Prot. 67.1 0 81.6 44 Com. Law 55.6 71.7 32.4 
AUSTR Cath. 69.1 0 39.2 55 Com. Law 57.7 N/A N/A 
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-ALIA 
CAN. Cath. 69.1 0 59.1 49 Com. Law 52.6 62.4 N/A 
AUST-
RIA 
Cath. 74.4 0 58.2 30 Civ. Law 38.3 60.4 29.7 
BEL. Cath. 82.1 1 47.4 44 Civil Law 28.2 50.5 20.7 
DEN. Prot. 75.0 1 29.9 5 Civil Law 42.4 63.0 23.9 
FIN. Prot. 79.4 0.5 49.1 4 Civil Law 21.1 60.3 40.0 
FRA. Cath. 63.6 0 37.8 21 Civil Law 34.3 53.2 21.0 
GER. Prot. 77.3 1 44.1 14 Civil Law 44.6 65.5 33.0 
ITA. Cath. 54.6 0 70.8 45 Civil Law 32.3 43.4 29.6 
NETH. Prot. 68.3 1 43.4 35 Civil Law 54.8 57.9 16.3 
NOR. Prot. 86.5 1 39.9 5 Civil Law 23.7 65.7 13.4 
SPAIN Cath. 78.1 0 55.0 25 Civil Law 21.9 44.6 23.8 
SWED. Prot. 77.4 1 30.9 4 Civil Law 49.2 62.8 29.9 
SWITZ Cath. 67.1 1 51.7 16 Civil Law 39.8 57.5 17.3 
U.K. Prot. 69.1 1 42.8 27 Com. Law 39.5 65.9 30.4 
[World Values Survey Databank.]  
 
Explanation of Majority Religion Score 
     All of the states in this study are majority Christian with varying populations of Catholicism, 
Protestantism, irreligion and other faiths. Sometimes classifications were extremely difficult, as 
in Switzerland where the population percentage practicing Protestantism and Catholicism are 
almost equal (47.5% versus 48.9%). In this case the state has still received the label of Catholic, 
as that denomination was larger even if admittedly only by a small amount. Canada and Australia 
are also only narrowly majority Catholic. In many states, though, the majority was strikingly 
clear, as in Spain (98.4% Catholic; 0.5% Protestant). The exact breakdown is as follows:  




U.S. 48.8 32.8 18.4 
AUSTRALIA 37.6 52.0 10.4 
CANADA 36.0 53.3 10.7 
AUSTRIA 52.7 32.1 15.2 
BELGIUM 6.5 91.7 1.8 
DENMARK 96.8 1.1 2.1 
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FINLAND 72.6 1.6 25.8 
FRANCE 1.9 93.7 4.4 
GERMANY 57.0 40.0 3.0 
ITALY 0.6 98.9 0.5 
NETHERLANDS 25.8 53.0 21.2 
NORWAY 94.1 0.8 5.1 
SPAIN 0.5 98.4 1.1 
SWEDEN 68.5 1.2 30.3 
SWITZERLAND 47.5 48.9 3.6 
U.K. 70.5 13.8 15.7 
[World Values Survey Databank, Question F025, Four-Wave Aggregate Data from 1981-2002] 
The variation in religious (or irreligious, as the case may be) minorities outside of Catholicism or 
Protestantism is fascinating, but failed to produce any significant statistical correlation with the 
amount or variation between religious and philosophical legal exemptions available in a state. 
Nor did it factor into any of this study’s original hypotheses. Ergo it was left out of the final 
analysis. 
 
Explanation of Religious Tolerance Score 
     Unfortunately, the World Values Survey does not contain a measure of “tolerance towards 
other religions,” and so this has by necessity been estimated by looking at tolerance of out-
groups in general. Only one measure in the World Values Survey databank involved tolerance, 
and so this measure has been utilized although it merely approximates an ideal measure of 
tolerance towards different faiths and the nonreligious. The specific wording of the question asks 
whether or not it is important to teach children tolerance and respect for other people. Taking the 
assumption that people commonly seek to inculcate their own values in children, this measure 
should provide a reliable indicator of the general valuation of “tolerance” as a virtue in the 
countries under consideration. If this assumption proves accurate, then it appears that tolerance is 
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highly valued across-the-board, with the highest valuation occurring in Norway and the lowest in 
Italy.  
 
Explanation of Political Religiosity Score 
 Presence of Explicitly 





U.S. No No 0 
AUSTRALIA No No 0 
CANADA No No 0 





DENMARK No Yes (Church of 
Denmark) 
1 





FRANCE No No 0 




ITALY No No 0 
NETHERL. Yes (Christen 
Democratisch Appèl) 
No 1 
NORWAY No Yes (Church of 
Norway) 
1 
SPAIN No No 0 





Volkspartei der Schweiz) 
No 1 
U.K. No Yes (Church of 
England) 
1 
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     The Political Religiosity Score seeks to measure the imbrications of the political and religious 
spheres by looking at the presence of major political parties with explicit religious ties and of 
official state churches.  Defining what constitutes a “major” party varies by country and is 
admittedly subjective. In the case of the European states, I looked at the number of seats each 
party currently holds in the European Parliament (EP), the European Union’s lower house, and if 
a party was not one of the top four seat-holders from its state, I did not count it as major. EP 
representation of a party tends to reflect its popularity in the reigning government of its own state.  
Although nearly every state has a major party affiliated with the Group of the European People’s 
Party (Christian Democrats), and often additional minor parties sharing this affiliation, not all of 
these contain “Christian” or another expressly religious term in their party names, so I did not 
count them as “explicitly religious.” In Sweden, for example, the Moderata Samlingspartiet and 
the Kristdemokraterna parties both maintain affiliation with the Group of the European People’s 
Party, but only the latter has an explicitly religious identifier (Krist equates to the English 
“Christ”) in its name. This latter party holds only one seat at the moment in the EP, excluding it 
from the four top seat-holding parties representing Sweden, and thus it is not listed as “major.” 
All data on current Members of the EP was gathered from the EP’s official website 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search.html). In the cases of Norway and Switzerland, 
which do not hold any seats in the EP, different factors were utilized to determine whether a 
party qualified as major. In Switzerland the Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei der Schweiz is 
currently part of a four-way coalition government and one of the largest parties, and this was 
deemed constitutive of a designation as “major.” The Norwegian Kristelig Folkeparti satisfies 
the criterion of containing a religious appellation in its title, but is not currently one of the four 
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most dominant parties in Norway in terms of electoral representation, ergo its exclusion from the 
Political Religiosity Score.  
 
Explanation of Professed Religiosity Score 
 %  that claims 




%  that claims to 






U.S. 81.4 81.8 81.6 
AUSTRALIA 39.2 N/A 39.2 
CANADA 59.1 N/A 59.1 
AUSTRIA 55.8 60.7 58.2 
BELGIUM 45.4 49.4 47.4 
DENMARK 29.2 30.7 29.9 
FINLAND 43.6 54.7 49.1 
FRANCE 39.2 36.5 37.8 
GERMANY 38.1 50.1 44.1 
ITALY 71.1 70.5 70.8 
NETHERL. 40.6 46.3 43.4 
NORWAY 39.3 40.6 39.9 
SPAIN 51.5 58.5 55.0 
SWEDEN 30.6 31.2 30.9 
SWITZ. 48.5 54.9 51.7 
U.K. 41.7 43.9 42.8 
[World Values Survey Databank] 
 
Explanation of Legal System Types 
     There exists great variance amongst the legal systems of this planet. “One approach in 
attempting to divide and classify the legal systems of the world has been to divide them into 
three main types of legal family or legal tradition: civil law, common law and socialist law” (De 
Cruz, 32). Using this method of classification, all of the states under scrutiny in this study 
operate under either the civil law or common law traditions. A brief, rudimentary summary of 
what divides these systems would here be practical. Civil law works in abstract, conceptual, 
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formalistic, codified rule-based terms proceeding from general principles; common law, on the 
other hand, is concrete, court-based and proceeds case-to-case seeking practical solutions as 
problems arise and thus gradually building up a complex of precedents (De Cruz, 39). Because 
common law is court-based, it boasts greater flexibility and speed of change than civil law. Civil 
law, in contrast, must strictly adhere to compiled codes and enjoys superior stability as change is 
bound by the slow-moving legislative process. Common law, it follows, would more quickly 
respond to shifting needs or attitudes within the population it serves. (This may have been one 
factor explaining why conscription was abolished relatively early and across-the-board in the 
four common law countries studied, whereas in the countries employing civil law, conscription 
has only ended recently if at all). While this was not one of the original independent variables set 
forth, the wisdom of its addition is palpable and owed entirely to Professor Clay Clemens (see 
“Acknowledgments”).  
 
Explanation of Valuing Freedom and One’s Say in Government 
     Because the dependent variable’s level conceivably depends upon which of two philosophic 
notions of justice is taken (accommodation-of-difference or exemption-skepticism), it seems 
logical to consider philosophical factors prevalent in public opinion. Two philosophical measures 
were taken into account: the percent of the population claiming to value the abstract concept of 
“freedom” more than that of “equality,” and the percent of the population who selected in a 
questionnaire of their overall priorities, “giving the people more say in government” as “most 
desirable.” As has been elsewhere stated, all data in regards to these factors were gathered from 
the World Values Survey.  
 














.283 .306 .189 .096 






.536* .653** .397 .201 






.173 .176 .160 -.017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .523 .514 .554 .951 
Values More 
Say in Gov’t 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.552* .585* .491 -.004 





.722** .769** .578* .096 





-.162 -.150 -.202 .107 





.183 .407 -.032 .524* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .498 .117 .907 .037 
Tolerance Pearson 
Correlation 
-.007 .195 -.200 .509* 






















* Indicates a significant correlation, ** Indicates a very significant correlation. 
 
Initial Conclusions 
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     For all of my original hypotheses I fail to reject the null. Religiosity by any measure – be it 
rate of church attendance, professed religiosity or political religiosity – does not correlate 
significantly in any way with a state’s level of relevant legal exemptions (except for professed 
religiosity and philosophical exemptions, the connection whereof will be given due attention 
momentarily). Professed religiosity and tolerance are the only initially proposed independent 
variables to bear some significant result, but in neither case was it the result initially predicted. It 
seems that greater valuation of tolerance increases the variation in availability of religious and 
nonreligious philosophical exemptions. Where such variation occurs, within the cases studied, 
the variation always favors religious exemptions over nonreligious ones. A population’s level of 
professed politicalness also correlates weakly but significantly with variation. While no intuitive 
explanation for these correlations exists, they perhaps warrant future investigation. As another 
fascinating aside, professed religiosity correlates weakly but significantly with a state’s level of 
philosophical exemptions, suggesting somewhat counter-intuitively that more religious 
populations may in some ways express greater tolerance towards nonreligious beliefs than less 
religious populations. Alternatively, religiosity might simply correlate with an approach to 
justice more closely aligned with accommodation-of-difference than with one-law-for-all. 
However because there is no correlation with overall exemption level or religious exemptions 
and because the correlation is only a weak one, I am hesitant to draw any conclusion based on it 
with any great degree of confidence.  
 
     Two independent variables not originally considered, both of which might be categorized as 
philosophical value measures – the preference for freedom over equality and the belief that 
increasing the say of the people should be the government’s top priority – correlate significantly 
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with increased exemptions and increased religious exemptions. Demanding particular attention a 
valuation of freedom as superior to equality maintains a very significant correlation with the 
level of religious exemptions offered by a state, suggesting that a preference for freedom over 
equality may entail a greater respect for religious freedom to the extent that such freedom merits 
protection even when incompatible with general laws.  It is not difficult to intuit the logic behind 
how a predilection for freedom over equality and the prioritizing of one’s “say” in government 
matters might lead to greater legal exemption levels, as both of these philosophical preferences 
involve esteem for self-determination and are thus plausibly indicative of a desire to maximize 
delegation of decision-making power to political actors at the individual-level.   
 
     However, by far the most significant connection detected by this study is the positive 
correlation found linking legal system type to the relevant legal exemption levels. While only 
four states with legal systems based in common law were analyzed (the U.S., Australia, Canada 
and the U.K.) as opposed to twelve states with civil law systems, the pattern that emerges strikes 
not only with the strength of the correlation but by the presence of a correlation across all 
relevant fields (overall exemption level, religious exemption level and nonreligious philosophical 
exemption level).  The correlation between legal system and exemption type inarguably qualifies 
as the finding this study can most confidently assert. It may be argued that these four states share 
many attributes beyond the basis of their legal system, such as a common language and cultural 
heritage, and so future research expanding the case studies to include less similar but nonetheless 
common law system-utilizing states such as India would perhaps prove illuminating. Whatever 
additional traits the U.S., Australia, Canada and the U.K. share that might differentiate them 
from the other states under consideration, a connection between a state’s legal system type and 
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the philosophy of justice promoted in the laws it enacts (be it a relativistic philosophy of 
acceptance, meaning accommodation-of-difference, or universalism and fairness as in one-law-
for-all) seems, prima facie, highly plausible. The institutional nature of this shared feature – legal 
system type – as opposed to the other, more abstract and cultural linkages between these states, 
as well as legal system type’s direct and undeniable connection to the legal realm, together seem 
to bolster at the theoretical level the chances of a connection between it and legal exemption 
levels.  
 
3. Analysis of the U.S. 
Hypotheses and Set-Up 
     The exemptions examined herein differ from those in earlier dataset comparing U.S. 
nationwide legal exemptions to those in Western Europe, Canada and Australia, as many areas 
regulated by federal law display no variation across the fifty states. For example, the Humane 
Slaughter Act, or the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (P.L. 85-765; 7 U.S.C. 1901 
et seq.), regulates animal slaughter methods across-the-board. Unfortunately the categories 
available for investigation were fewer, and the less extensive data analyzed within this section 
may be of less consequence than that in the previous, but nonetheless fascinates. I propose the 
following hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: “Red” (conservative) states will offer more exemptions than “blue” (liberal) 
states. 
• Hypothesis 2: States where a greater percentage of the population is unaffiliated with 
religion will offer fewer exemptions. 
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Additionally, I would expect some regional patterns to emerge. To circumvent the complexity of 
surveying laws in all fifty many states, only three exemption categories were researched: medical, 
discrimination and headgear. Further details on these categories, scoring methods and sources 
follow the resulting dataset:  
The Data 
 Medical Headgear Face-Veil No Photo 
 Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. Phil. Rel. 
Alabama 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Arizona 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
California 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hawaii 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Indiana 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Iowa 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Kentucky 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Louisiana 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Maine 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Mass. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 1 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Mississippi 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 0.5 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Montana 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Nebraska 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Nevada 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
New Hamp. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
New Mexico 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New York 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
N. Carolina 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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N. Dakota 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Ohio 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Oklahoma 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Oregon 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Pennsylvania 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Rhode Island 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
S. Carolina 0 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 
S. Dakota 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Tennessee 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Texas 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Utah 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Washington 1 1 1 1 0 0.75 0 1 
W. Virginia 0 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0 
Wisconsin 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
Wyoming 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Explanation of Exemption Categories 
     The medical exemption category, as in the dataset in the analysis across countries, refers to 
public school vaccine requirement exemptions. Missouri’s philosophical exemption “applies 
only to daycare, preschool and nursery school,” hence its half-point score in that exemption 
category (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2012). In all other instances within that 
category the availability of an exemption is scored as a 1 and the absence of an exemption with a 
0. The headgear category, again just as in the earlier analysis, regards accommodation in driver’s 
license photography policy of the licensee’s preference to wear a cap, turban or head-scarf. The 
dearth of relevant data to analyze resulted in this category being further segmented into three 
distinct exemptions: the allowance of head-scarves that cover the hair but do not obscure the face, 
face-veils (which, definitionally, do obscure the face) and photograph-free licenses (meant to 
accommodate a belief associating the soul with reflected or otherwise duplicated images and thus 
igniting a fear that photography steals the soul) (Schomberg-Scherff, 189).  The data on these 
three exemptions were gathered primarily from Mohamed Nimer’s paper, “Religious 
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Accommodation for Driver’s License Photographs: A review of codes, policies and practices in 
the 50 states.” Troublingly, some of the data within that study may not be wholly reliable.  For 
example, 35 States are listed as providing religious exemptions, including Minnesota (4). 
Afterwards, 7 states are listed in a different, likely mutually exclusive, category, also including 
Minnesota. Since Montana is absent from this section I believe one of the instances of 
"Minnesota" is likely to be a typo for "Montana" and have adjusted the data accordingly.  
 
Discrimination Exemption 
     Another exemption category considered was discrimination exemptions, denoting the 
exemptions often granted to religious institutions, via the Free Exercise Clause, that excuse these 
institutions from antidiscrimination requirements in their hiring practices. The extent of these 
exemptions varied considerably, ranging from allowing religious organizations to discriminate in 
favor of hiring members of their own creed but not to discriminate based on any other criteria 
(Wisconsin), to allowing discrimination based on sexual orientation when deviation from 
heterosexual norms conflicted with the organization’s religious beliefs (California), to the 
broadness of condoning “any action with respect to matters of employment… calculated by such 
organization to promote the religious principles for which it is established or maintained” 
(Massachusetts) (Harvard Law Review, 1996). However in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission et al. (October, 
2011), the Supreme Court ruled that all religious organizations have the right to discriminate at 
least in their selections for ministerial decisions. Because there then exists a federal level 
religious exemption and no philosophical exemptions at the state level, this category would lack 
variation and was thus dismissed from this study, although it is certainly relevant to note as 
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another example of the abundance of religious exemptions compared to nonreligious 
philosophical exemptions. Education was also considered as a potential realm for research, but 
the religious and nonreligious philosophical exemptions awarded in that area tend to occur at a 
national law, such as the exemption of the Amish from compulsory education, grounded in a 
perceived conflict between such education and their parents’ religious liberty, awarded in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder (Dwyer, 52). 
 
Index of Relative Exemption Levels in the 50 States 















Alabama 2 2 0 2 
Alaska 2 2 0 2 
Arkansas 3 2 1 1 
Arizona 3 2 1 1 
California 3 2 1 1 
Colorado 3 2 1 1 
Connecticut 2 2 0 2 
Delaware 1 1 0 1 
Florida 2 2 0 2 
Georgia 1 1 0 1 
Hawaii 2 2 0 2 
Idaho 3 2 1 1 
Illinois 2 2 0 1 
Indiana 4 4 0 4 
Iowa 2 2 0 2 
Kansas 3 3 0 3 
Kentucky 1 1 0 1 
Louisiana 3 2 1 1 
Maine 2 1 1 0 
Maryland 2 2 0 2 
Mass. 2 2 0 2 
Michigan 3.5 2.5 1 1.5 
Minnesota 5 3 2 1 
Mississippi 1 1 0 1 
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Missouri 3.5 3 0.5 2.5 
Montana 2 2 0 2 
Nebraska 3 3 0 3 
Nevada 3 3 0 3 
New Hamp. 1 1 0 1 
New Jersey 4 3 1 2 
New Mexico 2 1 1 0 
New York 3 2 1 1 
N. Carolina 2 2 0 2 
N. Dakota 4 3 1 2 
Ohio 3 2 1 1 
Oklahoma 3 2 1 1 
Oregon 3 3 0 3 
Pennsylvania 5 4 1 3 
Rhode Island 2 2 0 2 
S. Carolina 2.5 2.5 0 2.5 
S. Dakota 2 2 0 2 
Tennessee 3 3 0 3 
Texas 4 2 2 0 
Utah 4 2 2 0 
Vermont 3 2 1 1 
Virginia 3 2 1 1 
Washington 5.75 3.75 2 1.75 
W. Virginia 1.5 1.5 0 1.5 
Wisconsin 4 3 1 2 
Wyoming 2 2 0 2 
 
Initial Observations 
     Although there is clear variation, no immediately comprehensible pattern surfaces from this 
index. The average number of exemptions offered by a state according to this table is 2.715. The 
states offering the most exemptions (in each case 4 or more) are Indiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. These states possess little in common 
geographically or demographically. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the states offering 
fewer than 2 exemptions are Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire and 
West Virginia. There appears to be some logic to this grouping: two of these states are in New 
England while the other four are often categorized as Southern. Yet those two regions are 
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generally considered to lie on opposing ends of the political continuum and should not, 
intuitively, take similar attitudes in regards to the justice of exemptions. Those states displaying 
the most variation in availability between religious and philosophical exemptions (always in 
favor of more religious exemptions, as in the country-level data of the previous section of this 
thesis) were Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Nevada, Nebraska, Kansas and Indiana, all with 
variation scores of 3 or greater. Many of the states in this list are in the “American Heartland” 
and almost all are “red” – the exceptions to the latter, of course, being Oregon and the urban 
areas of Pennsylvania and Nevada. Indiana is also sometimes considered a swing state.     
 












Alabama 5 40.8 8 
Alaska 5 48.4 N/A 
Arkansas 4 36.0 13 
Arizona 4 35.2 22 
California 1 35.9 21 
Colorado 4 46.5 25 
Connecticut 1 41.7 23 
Delaware 1 44.2 19 
Florida 3 36.3 16 
Georgia 5 35.5 13 
Hawaii 1 35.9 N/A 
Idaho 5 39.5 18 
Illinois 1 38.3 15 
Indiana 4 35.6 16 
Iowa 2 47.9 15 
Kansas 5 39.2 14 
Kentucky 4 40.7 12 
Louisiana 4 36.8 8 
Maine 1 54.4 25 
Maryland 1 41.8 17 
Mass. 1 44.6 17 
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Michigan 1 42.8 17 
Minnesota 1 52.2 13 
Missouri 4 35.5 16 
Mississippi 5 42.4 6 
Montana 5 46.8 20 
Nebraska 5 35.5 16 
Nevada 3 35.3 21 
New Hamp. 2 44.3 26 
New Jersey 1 31.4 12 
New Mexico 2 38.8 21 
New York 1 30.9 17 
N. Carolina 4 36.4 12 
N. Dakota 5 45.4 12 
Ohio 3 43.7 17 
Oklahoma 5 36.4 12 
Oregon 1 48.7 27 
Pennsylvania 1 40.1 13 
Rhode Island 1 41.2 23 
S. Carolina 5 37.6 10 
S. Dakota 5 51.5 12 
Tennessee 4 32.8 12 
Texas 5 26.9 12 
Utah 5 33.6 16 
Vermont 1 48.6 26 
Virginia 4 35.3 18 
Washington 1 48.4 23 
W. Virginia 4 36.1 19 
Wisconsin 1 49.8 16 
Wyoming 5 43.8 20 
 
Explanation of Political Orientation Scores 
     States were assigned a political orientation based on the national election results from 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2008. Higher scores correspond to greater Republican tendencies and lower 
scores to more Democratic ones. If a state voted Republican in all four elections it received a 
score of 5; if it voted Republican in three of the four elections it was assigned a 4. 3 designates a 
swing state that voted twice for the Democratic candidate and twice for the Republican candidate 
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over the course of these last four elections. A 2 was given to a state that went blue in three of the 
four elections and a 1 if it voted Democratic consistently in the last four election cycles.  
 












-.104 -.054 -.112 .063 
Sig. (2-tailed) .473 .712 .440 .663 





-.115 -.188 .026 -.169 
Sig. (2-tailed) .428 .191 .858 .239 





-.004 .011 -.019 .031 
Sig. (2-tailed) .981 .939 .897 .829 
N 50 50 50 50 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




     Once more, I fail to reject the null for any of the hypotheses put forward at the outset. A 
deficiency of breadth in the exemption categories inspected may be responsible for the lack of 
significant correlation. It could also be that the unique character of each state precludes the 
possibility of any sweeping explanation for differences in the availability of religious and 
nonreligious philosophical legal exemptions. It is also possible that a pattern would have indeed 
emerged with analysis of more potential independent variables. However this comparative 
exercise does not wholly lack merit, as lessons can be drawn from this analysis of the varying 
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legal exemptions across the fifty states. The index confirms that religious exemptions appear to 
always outnumber philosophical exemptions, just as in the country-level data from the earlier 
section of this thesis. Moreover, the mere presence of variation across states in the U.S., even if it 
is unclear what causes the variation or how significant that variation might be considering the 
very limited spheres of exemption examined, fascinates and implies there may be gain from 




Findings, Implications & Suggestions for Future Inquiry 
          The treasure-hunt of reconnoitering this under-explored but critical area has yielded a 
bounty of intriguing correlations and further questions. Of course these findings suggest myriad 
implications, and any hubristic attempt to panoptically construe them could not succeed, but I 
will endeavor as inclusive a sketch as is possible. Common law systems appear to promote the 
accommodation-of-difference model of legal justice, whereas civil law systems tend to produce 
policies of exemption-skepticism, with far fewer belief-based legal accommodations. This is the 
finding that can be drawn from the above data with the most certainty. A weaker but still 
significant correlation appears to exist linking certain philosophical attitudes when widely held in 
the public mind – namely a professed preference for freedom over equality and the belief that 
greater say in government should be endorsed as a top priority – with the prevalence of belief-
based legal exemptions. This suggests philosophical bases may not only conceptually underlie 
the debate over which of these two legal philosophies qualifies as most just, but tangibly 
influence it. The two philosophies referenced are of course accommodation-of-difference and 
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exemption-skepticism: “while multiculturalists celebrate the provision of cultural exemptions as 
realizing a more substantive equality than that achieved under a difference-blind model of 
citizenship, critics argue that cultural exemptions are unwarranted in theory and discriminatory 
in practice” (McGann 1-2). The analysis of variances within the United States proved 
inconclusive and rather unsatisfying but the very presence of variation does proffer an area for 
further research, and the analysis also corroborated the finding from the country-level 
investigation that religious exemptions remain more numerous than nonreligious philosophical 
exemptions. Further inquiry, in the territory of political and legal theory, should perhaps be 
conducted concerning this disparity, as regardless of where one stands in regards to the question 
of accommodation-of-difference versus one-law-for-all, when a belief-based exemption is 
offered, it puzzles the secular mind that potential beneficiaries should be discriminated against 
on the basis of their pertinent belief’s lack of divine inspiration. As indicated towards the end of 
the introduction (13-14), when exemptions spread from the domain of the religious to that of 
internally-derived belief, a problem arises in that the boundaries delineating which beliefs then 
warrant exemption liquefy. Although defining what counts as “religious” can present a problem, 
legitimate religious concerns remain easier to recognize than a notion as recent and amorphous 
as a nonreligious belief nonetheless representing a transcendent concern worthy of legal 
exemption. When nonreligious beliefs are weighed as equal to religious ones, it complicates the 
justifiability of all belief-based exemptions because of this difficulty in charting what specifically 
qualifies a conviction for legal exemption. The consequences of secularization, then, may 
include an erosion of faith in the justice of belief-based exemptions that eventually takes shape in 
profound exemption-skepticism. If true, this would aid in making sense of what perhaps 
constitutes the most initially disconcerting finding of this study: that where religiosity is highest, 
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the most philosophical exemptions are offered. Religious and nonreligious exemptions do not 
quantitatively betray an inherently inimical relationship, although the former remains ever 
dominant.  
 
     Yet stronger than any polled representation of the public’s moral compass in predicting a 
state’s philosophy towards justice is its legal system. As common law systems offer greater 
flexibility (relative to civil law systems) and more quickly reflect the public’s desires, it may be 
that the citizenry’s philosophy does serve as the primary factor steering a country’s laws towards  
a given philosophy of justice (accommodation-of-difference versus one-law-for-all). Just as the 
common law countries studied above ended conscription decades before the civil law countries 
studied began that process, it is possible that they offer a glimpse of the philosophical attitude 
towards exemptions that will eventually come to pass in the civil law countries (and that have 
already arrived in Norway and Germany), although this prospect classifies as speculation more 
than prediction (just as the earlier suggestion of secularization potentially resulting in enhanced 
exemption-skepticism). A more thorough theoretic discussion of this issue will not be undertaken 
here, as it exceeds the scope of this thesis. While the greater portion of future scholarship to be 
directed upon the subject of belief-based legal exemptions may foreseeably be normative, 
hopefully the quantitative and comparative foundation here provided can add some modicum of 
insight and prove helpful. 
 
     The greatest challenge to this study’s primary finding, the influence of legal system type on a 
country’s approach to justice and legal exemptions, stands prone to the criticism that other 
shared factors (common history, language, cultural heritage and perhaps moral norms) binding 
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the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Canada account for their similar rate of belief-based exemptions. 
While this is a valid concern that future research may confirm or dispel, it is not difficult to 
discern the logic of a state’s legal system affecting its laws, to suspect concrete institutional 
features as causes before resorting to explanations stemming from less measurable cultural 
dynamics (which may still signify the underlying bases for the institutional processes) and to 
appreciate the strength of the correlation tying legal system type to frequency of belief-based 
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